Jordan-Hamas: the untold story

  Saad Hattar

Jordan's move to thaw relations with the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) following nine years of estrangement has raised eyebrows as to the timing and the motives behind this tactic.

Internal and external factors dictated the rapprochement amid growing Jordanian dismay at US and Israeli behavior--the kingdom's main strategic allies since the turn of the century. Hence, the timing bears significance considering the last months of President George W. Bush's tenure and Israel's political paralysis. On the other side, the Palestinian Authority led by Mahmoud Abbas looks headed toward failure in light of Hamas' pounding and US-Israeli indifference.

Anxious about the deadlocked Palestinian track, the dwindling prospects for a viable Palestinian state and disenchanted with the lip service paid by the outgoing Republican administration, Jordan has moved fast to rebuild ties with Hamas--an arch enemy of the PA in the West Bank and an offshoot of the powerful Muslim Brotherhood.

Jordan's concerns are strategic. If the prospects for a Palestinian state diminish, it revives the old notion of the Jordan option, positing the kingdom as an alternative state for Palestinians. Jordan is home to 1.9 million Palestinian refugees, 41 percent of the UNRWA-registered refugees in the region and more than 50 percent of Jordan's population.

Jordan is not happy with the performance of Fateh, and Abbas has become a lame duck president pending new elections. There is a growing belief that Khaled Mishaal will become the next president, as Hamas seems bound to win any upcoming elections in the occupied Palestinian territories. But the call for dialogue came from Hamas, which has grown discontent with the increasing boundaries laid down by host countries from Syria to Iran.

The rapprochement with Hamas started two months ago with a preliminary meeting. Subsequently, two rounds of dialogue were held between GID (Jordanian Intelligence Services) Director General Lt. General Mohammad Thahabi and Hamas representatives led by Mohammad Nazzal.

The Beirut-based Nazzal was declared persona non grata in 1999, when the authorities here expelled five Hamas leaders, notably the head of the movement's political bureau Khaled Mishaal. Since then Mishaal has been living between Damascus and Doha. Before 1999, however, the late King Hussein used Hamas as a bargaining chip in the face of nationalist PLO leader Yasser Arafat--who sought to keep Jordan at bay from the West Bank. Since then, the kingdom's strategy shifted and it now considers the creation of a Palestinian state "a higher national interest".

Jordan and Hamas both have vested interests in reviving their once strong bonds--for their own respective benefits. Jordan wants Hamas to acknowledge its 1988 severance of ties with the West Bank (part of the kingdom between 1950 and 1967) halt any meddling in the country's affairs or intertwining politically with the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, the most influential party on the local scene.

Parallel to the dialogue with Hamas, the authorities reopened channels here with the Islamic current, ending a decade of cold relations inspired by the tense ties with Hamas. Analysts see this move as a preemptive tactic to contain looming threats to Jordan. Since its inception in 1946, the Brotherhood has functioned as a social safety valve in a traditionally religious state, especially at crucial junctures: the assassination of Jordan's founder King Abdullah I in July 1951; the alleged military putsch in 1957 attributed to leftist parties; the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the show-down pitting the Jordanian army against PLO factions in 1970.

Hamas seems fed up with the limited maneuvers imposed on it by its regional allies and interlocutors Syria, Iran, Egypt and Qatar. Many Hamas leaders find in Jordan a strategic depth with fewer red lines to cross than is the case in the other countries. Iran has not been happy with the domino-effect detente across the region: indirect negotiations between Syria and Israel, Egypt-brokered calm in Gaza and the German-brokered swap of PoWs between Hizballah and Israel. All these moves have not distracted US attention from the simmering nuclear file, and Hamas has been forced to restrain itself as a result.

Although Jordan labels its dialogue with Hamas as security-oriented, leaks suggest that the kingdom might exploit its revived good offices with Hamas to win the release of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit--believed to be in the custody of Hamas militants since he was captured in Gaza two years ago.

Hence, the rapprochement with Hamas and its local ally the Muslim Brotherhood could serve as a safety valve in case of future pressure on Jordan for some kind of a link-up with what will be left of the West Bank.

On the other side of the compass, King Abdullah II made a breakthrough visit last week to Baghdad, the first by an Arab leader to war-torn Iraq since the US invasion in 2003. Economic and strategic considerations took the king to oil-rich Iraq. The step provoked Jordan's strategic western allies, its peace treaty partner Israel and close partner the PA.

Officially, Jordan insists that those meetings fell within tactics to diversify its options in a fast-changing region, where old allies trade trenches and the prospects of an independent Palestinian state fade away. Nor are they designed to undermine the authority of Abbas, Jordan's traditional ally. Likewise, Jordan has no plans to rescind the peace treaty with Israel or give up its strategic alliance with the US--Jordan's major donor state.

Jordan has reached a stage, however, where it has to reshuffle its cards ahead of possible crucial changes west of the Jordan River. The "lip service" paid by President Bush to the creation of a Palestinian state at the end of 2008 is not taken seriously in political circles here.- Published 21/8/2008 © bitterlemons-international.org

Saad Hattar is an Amman-based political analyst.