At stake, the state of Lebanon

  Nizar Abdel-Kader

The violence started in Beirut on May 7 following a press conference by Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah in which he urged his militia to use force "to protect Hizballah's weapons". Nasrallah added that the Lebanese government had "declared war by designating Hizballah's private telephone network as an illegal act [that] should be removed." He also decried the government decision to remove the Beirut International Airport chief security officer for failing to deal with Hizballah intelligence efforts to monitor the airport.

By over-running Beirut, Hizballah has demonstrated with force what many observers already knew--that it and its allies have the military power to devastate the city and to impose their control on the international airport and the sea port of Beirut. The military operation stopped short of attacking the Prime Minister's Office and the Beirut residences of Saad Hariri and Walid Jumblatt, the two principal leaders of the March 14 coalition.

It would be an exaggeration to say that Hizballah's move was designed solely to force the government to revoke its two decisions concerning the telephone network and the removal of Brigadier General Wafic Shoucair. There is a deep conviction among most Lebanese that the causes for this drastic military move can be traced back to August 2006, when Hizballah declared a "divine victory" in its war with Israel. It became clear then that Hizballah would be turning its weapons inward, trying to assume a greater role in internal power-sharing and to enhance its status as a "state within a state".

Surprisingly, the Lebanese army with its strong presence in West Beirut did not react to Hizballah and its allies' moves to occupy all the streets and to shut down all (and to burn a few) of the March 14 media institutions. The results were at least 81 dead and 200 wounded in clashes in Beirut and across the country, in addition to a political and military victory for Hizballah and Iran against the March 14 coalition and its backers in the United States and Saudi Arabia.

The neutral position of the army in the current crisis was understandable; it was based on army command concerns about preserving its unity. The army faced a double-edged risk: the possible desertion of both Shi'ite and Sunni officers and soldiers, depending on the respective perceptions of which side might, in the course of events, benefit from the army's involvement.

The true causes of this military showdown can be linked to the efforts made by Hizballah to bring down the Siniora government as a step toward dominating Lebanon and turning it into an Iranian protectorate. This struggle involves two conflicting plans: that of the March 14 coalition, focusing on implementation of the Taif agreement, establishment of the international tribunal and the rebuilding of an independent and sovereign state; and the Hizballah plan calling for the continued presence of Hizballah's weapons and the creation of its own state within a state.

Hizballah and its allies prevailed in the military showdown in West Beirut, but at the political level Hizballah realized it was not a clear victor in what has been a lose/lose confrontation. Sentiments against Hizballah among Sunnis, Christians and Druze have become stronger than ever before. The March 14 coalition has been politically humiliated and is ready to accept a compromise on matters such as the constitution of a national unity government and new electoral legislation. The army emerged with a tainted image and shaken morale, especially after Prime Minister Fuad Siniora declared disappointment: "I have called on the army to live up to its national responsibilities... and this has not happened." Moreover, the deepening of sectarian divides among Shi'ites, Sunnis and Druze could create more temptation toward militarization and jihadism.

To minimize the risks of a conflagration, the Arab League dispatched a delegation of eight foreign ministers headed by the prime minister of Qatar along with General Secretary Amr Moussa to diffuse the military situation and bring the parties to a conference in Doha. The breakthrough achieved in the Doha conference will facilitate the election of General Michel Suleiman as president and open the way to form a new government. This will not resolve the current deep political crisis, but may provide an effective mechanism to stop the slide toward civil strife. With such prospects, Iran seems to remain the ultimate winner of this game, while the future role of Syria will be reduced to serving as a conduit for Iranian logistical support to Hizballah.

The US lacks an effective policy toward Lebanon. In the aftermath of Hizballah's takeover of West Beirut, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice pledged US support for the Lebanese government. So far, the only option for the US remains to supply the Lebanese army with the necessary equipment to increase its firepower and mobility, but one should keep in mind that the Lebanese army won't confront Hizballah because of the high risk of shattering its unity and weakening its cohesiveness.

It is very doubtful that Israel will attempt another attack against Hizballah. Conceivably, the only way to contain Hizballah will be through a change of US policy toward Iran and Syria by adopting one of two options: either enlarge its present theater of operations to cover Iran and Syria or engage Iran in serious diplomatic negotiations. A decision, however, will wait on the next US administration.

Great uncertainties center on Iran's goal of having a forward military base on the eastern Mediterranean shore. This affair is sending shock waves through the entire region. Meanwhile, electing a new president and rebuilding government institutions will save Lebanon from becoming a fertile ground for al-Qaeda; this is in everyone's interest.- Published 22/5/2008 © bitterlemons-international.org

Nizar Abdel-Kader is a political analyst/columnist at Ad-Diyar newspaper, Beirut.