An opportunity they can’t afford to miss

by  Abbas K. Kadhim

The plight of Iraqi Kurds dates back to times much earlier than the era of the ousted regime of Saddam Hussein--although his reign initiated some of the harshest episodes for the Kurds. But Saddam Hussein was not the only perpetrator. Boxed into a very critical geopolitical zone, the Kurds in Iraq have always fallen victim to brutal international relations games beyond their own concerns. These are games of interests and tradeoffs between the regional powers, on one hand, and the superpowers on the other.

When the victors of World War I carved out the areas that make up the Middle East today from the Ottoman Empire, they did not grant the Kurds a country they could call Kurdistan. Hence, the Kurds found their native area divided among many countries: Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq. Recognizing the Kurds’ yearning for independence, the governments of these countries became aware of the potential political and territorial threat they represented to each state. This led to harsh policies that ranged from some forms of cultural warfare to blatant genocide.

Equally immoral, however, was the use of the Kurds as a trump card by certain states to influence the outcome of border disputes and other regional political clashes. A good example of this were the policies of the Shah of Iran, who gave full support to the Kurdish war on the Iraqi regime until he gained full concessions from Saddam Hussein in 1975. Subsequently, he sealed the borders and cut his military assistance, leaving his Kurdish allies to face Saddam’s brutality. This operation was not as simple as it sounds, because the Shah was not acting alone. He was serving as a proxy for the United States, which was angry with the Iraqi government, especially after the nationalization of oil in Iraq in 1972. The embargo on Iraq, combined with the encouragement of a Kurdish rebellion aided by the US through Iran, brought Iraq to its knees. In a televised statement, Saddam Hussein justified the signing of the humiliating 1975 agreement with the Shah by saying, “We had only three bombs left in our arsenal.” Iraq was then unexpectedly rescued shortly thereafter by the Soviets, and the Kurds lost their usefulness, and were thus forsaken. Asked about the immoral abandonment of the Kurds, Henry Kissinger was quoted as saying, “covert military activity is not to be confused with missionary work.”

Hussein's campaign of genocide in Halabja in 1988; the military operation that was named “al Anfal” (or "spoils of war," a Quranic reference); and the decision to look the other way by the Reagan-Bush administration and then continue that silence through the first half of the following Bush administration cost the Kurds thousands of lives and created in them a deep sense of abandonment. But with the subsequent Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, these same crimes became a convenient slogan for the very people who had maintained their silence and supported Saddam Hussein in his war against their archenemy, the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Kurds were given a safe haven after the 1991 Gulf War and their popular uprising in the Iraqi north and south--unlike the Shiites who were the subjects of a Kissinger-like attitude.

But the Kurds handled their new status of quasi-independence rather clumsily. They began shooting at each other and the world was stunned to see that one faction allied itself with Saddam Hussein in order to vanquish what were previously its comrades in struggle. While the violence has been contained, rivalry persists between the two major factions, one led by Jalal Talabani, and the other by Masoud Barzani. There is also the element of Ansar al Islam, which does not pay allegiance to either party and, despite its recent losses, can be a real troublemaker.

It now seems that the Kurds in Iraq are being presented with the golden opportunity to attain a status better than that of any other Kurdish minority in the region. As it looks now, the Kurds are represented in the Governing Council by a number proportional to their overall population. The same can be said of their representation in the newly formed cabinet, in which they control the most important ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This is remarkable, considering the history of the region.

In a democratic Iraq, any future election will mimic this outcome. The question is whether the Kurds are satisfied with this situation, or whether they have something else in mind. Will they accept a share of power and wealth in proportion to their percentage in the overall Iraqi population and forego the dream of an independent state? Listening to the statements of their leaders, one cannot be certain. Most likely they want to secure the current gains and continue to work for the greater dream of an independent state. That could be very dangerous for the future of the Kurdish people in Iraq and elsewhere. It is highly unlikely that any change in the foreseeable future will alter the geopolitical circumstances that always rendered a viable Kurdish state impossible, in particular Turkey's vehement objection to such a state on its borders. Therefore, the Kurdish leaders would be more prudent if they were to utilize their energy in finding ways to attain the best and most durable status within a unified and a democratic Iraq. This kind of arrangement would initiate extremely powerful moral pressure on other countries to finally adopt decent policies towards their own Kurdish populations.-Published 18/12/03©bitterlemons-international.org

Abbas K. Kadhim teaches at the University of California, Berkeley. He is originally from Najaf in Iraq and participated in the uprising against the Iraqi leadership following the 1991 Gulf War.