Normalization, but after a solution

an interview with  Volker Perthes

BI: How central do you judge the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to be to Arab-Israel relations?

Perthes: We will not see any substantial normalization of Israel-Arab relations in general unless there is a solution to the Arab-Israel conflict and particularly the Palestinian conflict. We also see that for Arabs in countries geographically more distant from the conflict theater, Israel is basically perceived not as a neighbor in the region but as a participant in this conflict. This perception has certainly been strengthened through the decades by the fact that Palestinian refugees are all over the place; they form a trans-national element of this international conflict and basically remind their host societies all the time that there is a conflict here that must be solved before normalization.

I would also add a geo-economic factor: as long as there is a state of conflict between Israel and its immediate neighbors, Israel will actually be an obstacle to all kinds of communications between the Arab east and the Arab west. Once there is peace between Israel and Palestine and Syria, [Israel] could theoretically turn into a communications and infrastructure link. When Syria and Israel first started to negotiate after Madrid in 1991 and there were road works on the road from Damascus to Kuneitra, everyone in Damascus thought this was part of a highway to Palestine and Israel, within the framework of social and economic follow-ups to peace. In public parlance they started to call it the highway of peace.

BI: Is this the sort of normalization you visualize beyond the conflict?

Perthes: Not all Arab states and societies will move at the same speed. When we travel to countries like Syria, we sense that when people think about the possible dimensions of peace, they start to remember that there were once all kinds of relations between the inhabitants of Mandatory Palestine and Syria before 1948.

BI: Some say the conflict serves as an excuse for Arab rulers to evade demands for reforms and democratization?

Perthes: Of course it is used as an excuse. This doesn’t mean that the Arab-Israel conflict isn't there and doesn't strain military budgets. But Arab regimes try to use it as a source of legitimacy and a way of postponing reforms and not conceding the control that a strong security state has achieved. Today, particularly after the Iraq war, this discourse on the part of Arab regimes is not very convincing for much of Arab society. Today, in Syria, liberals would say, yes, the conflict should be taken seriously, but we can only participate if we achieve political openness and reform. On a wider Arab scale there are more and more questions from civil society to governments, asking whether they haven't hidden behind this conflict.

BI: In this regard, some Arab regimes are also accused by Israel of perpetuating the refugee issue as part of their reform evasion tactics.

Perthes: This might be so, but the issue is still there and we're now having a debate in which the state of Israel is adamant that the refugees not return to Israel, and Israel wants some control over the possible return of Palestinian refugees to a future state of Palestine. So there is a kind of coalition between the Israeli-right wing and some Arab regimes in not solving this problem.

BI: How would you factor the recent events in Iraq into this discussion?

Perthes: What I find interesting here is that there was an enormous fear on the part of Arab elites that the United States' occupation of Iraq would lead to a premature normalization of Iraqi-Israeli relations, beginning with reopening the Kirkuk-Haifa pipeline. This phenomenon shows us the fears of Arab elites that the West at large and the US in particular would aim to break apart the Arab world and try to achieve partial solutions between Arab states and Israel, thereby weakening the Arab nation as such and the chances of the Palestinians or Syria to get a fair deal. We also see that Israeli politicians were not dealing with the issue in a sober manner, but rather embarrassing their few partners in the Arab world, like the Jordanians, by trumpeting news of opening the pipeline before any Iraqi government had been consulted at all (and ignoring technical questions about the condition of the pipeline). As soon as the current temporary Iraqi government was in place, they made it clear that as far as they were concerned they would not preempt normalization, but rather would work on the basis of the Saudi/Arab League initiative, which calls for normalization in return for Israeli withdrawal.

BI: Finally, Syria appears to be in a pivotal position today vis-à-vis two conflict situations: in Iraq and in Israel/Palestine.

Perthes: And Syria has its own occupation problem with Israel, and a clear priority of regaining its occupied territories on the Golan. I'm not sure the Syrians have really realized that the US no longer sees them as a candidate for a peace process. The irony is that we have a Syrian government that is unable to give the proper signals to Washington and to Tel Aviv that they are interested in a peace process, though this government is probably more interested in a process than its predecessor. The late President Hafez al Asad thought of peace as a strategic option in terms of a regional power equilibrium. President Bashar al Asad uses this same term, but with reference to Syria's need to modernize the economy and the country. The Syrians under Bashar have tried to make clear that they don't want to be dragged into a military confrontation with Israel, but for political reasons they are hardly able to give up their support in principle for the Palestinian cause, which in their thinking includes the right of armed resistance.-Published 6/11/03©bitterlemons-international.org

Volker Perthes is head of the Middle East and Africa Research Group of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin. He has published extensively on the questions of Middle East political economy and international relations.