From naivetè to skepticism

an interview with  Mustafa Kamal al-Sayyid

BI: What were the implications of Israel's creation on the Arab states and public opinion?

Said: In the beginning, they didn't understand the intentions of the Zionist movement. There were contacts between the Zionist movement and some Egyptian intellectuals [for example], and some of these Egyptians welcomed the presence of Jews in Palestine in the 19th century and welcomed, in particular, the establishment of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

However, when it became clear that the intention of the Zionist Agency was to establish a Jewish state at the expense of the Palestinians, Arab countries started to realize the future.

When the state of Israel was established, Arab countries participated in a military effort to end the presence of the Jewish state in Palestine. Despite the fact that Arab governments took the public position of not recognizing Israel, there were secret [Israeli] contacts with King Abdullah of Jordan. There were also some contacts between Israeli groups and American mediators and Egypt in 1955. However, in general, all Arab countries until 1973 took the public position of condemning any attempt to establish contact with Israel or the Israelis. This was reaffirmed in 1965 when Tunisian president Habib Bourguiba said that it was a mistake for the Arabs not to accept the United Nations partition resolution of 1947. Several Arab governments criticized this declaration.

BI: What was the impact of the first peace treaty and Egypt's breaking of the ranks?

Kamal: This was the beginning of a major rift among the Arabs. In the beginning, most Arab countries were opposed. Some, however, refused to break diplomatic relations with Egypt.

After the [1991] second Gulf War, a change started to prevail in the Arab world. Following the Madrid conference, Arab countries started to have diplomatic relations with Israel, particularly after Israel accepted the Oslo agreement in 1993 and allowed the Palestinians to have (formally-speaking, at least) an independent authority in the West Bank and Gaza.

BI: How does Arab public opinion view the prospect of normalization with Israel?

Kamal: The majority of the Arabs view Israel as determined to expand its territories at the expense of the Palestinians. Such policies don't auger well for having cordial and civil relations with Arab countries. I think the Arabs in general would not mind having peace with Israel, if Israel accepts also to recognize and put into effect Palestinian legitimate national rights. This has not happened so far and I think that Arab public opinion is quite skeptical of the sincerity of the Israeli government and of a large part of the Israeli political establishment in making peace with the Arabs by accepting those Arab conditions summarized under the theme of exchanging "territory for peace."

I am quite doubtful also, and my doubts are not based on any suspicion of Israel, but simply the fact that there is a large disparity in power between Israel and Arab countries. This does not persuade Israel to relinquish its control over the occupied territories.

BI: How would you characterize opinion in the Arab world vis-à-vis Israel today?

Kamal: The majority of the Arabs are quite critical of the policies of the Israeli government. However, a certain minority in all Arab countries believes that the Arabs should not sacrifice their future in favor of the Palestinians and that it would be better for Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq to have peace with Israel and to leave the Palestinians on their own.

This minority also "admires" the scientific and technological achievements of the state of Israel. But these Arab intellectuals are not capable of convincing Arab public opinion that it would be beneficial for the Arabs to abandon the Palestinians because the policies of the Israeli government under [Benjamin] Netanyahu and [Ariel] Sharon don't show any consideration for the Arabs. Their policies are basically racist policies and thus the Israeli government is weakening the position of those so-called--I don't like to call them moderates--but those who are in favor of peace with Israel at any price.

BI: Why do certain countries have warmer relations with Israel?

Kamal: Jordan and Egypt signed peace treaties with Israel in which they believe that they gained something in return. Egypt would say that having diplomatic relations with Israel was the price that it paid for getting back the Sinai. The Jordanians would say that, although they did not get back the West Bank, the Israelis were committed to granting the Palestinians autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza and that [since] the Palestinians were negotiating with Israel, diplomatic relations would help Jordan to have a say in those negotiations.

A large number of countries, not only Arab countries, were involved in a global solution [at the Madrid conference]. A lot of Arabs said that it was a good way to avoid full diplomatic relations with Israel, but have some contact as a means of convincing Israeli public opinion of the benefits of peace and thus pushing the Israeli government to offer those so-called "concessions" that are the basis for a lasting peace.

BI: What are the best and worse case scenarios for the future?

Kamal: The best case scenario is for the Israeli government to accept the terms [that were negotiated] between the Palestinians and the Israeli Labor government before the elections that brought Sharon to power. Then Israel could conclude peace treaties with Syria and Lebanon along the terms that were presented by Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia.

The worst case scenario is for Israel to continue the building of what it calls the "security fence", which will ensure continued hostility between Israel and the Palestinians, and continued hostility between Israel and the Arab governments. For me and for many people, this "security fence" means that Israel does not acknowledge the rights of the Palestinians to have sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza; insists on dictating its own terms for relations with the Arabs; and does not show any consideration for legitimate Arab demands.

BI: Do you think there is any chance of all-out war?

Kamal: I don't exclude the likelihood of another war. I think that [United States] President Bush and Sharon would benefit temporarily from a military action launched by Israel on Syria and on Iran. President Bush is having problems convincing American public opinion of the justifications for the Iraq war and maintaining large numbers of troops in Iraq. Syria is considered a country supporting terrorists and I think that this could be presented as another front in the war on terror, especially if Israel attacks nuclear installations in Iran.

Of course, this will not resolve the problems Israel is having with the Palestinians. (Some Israeli leaders believe that if there is resistance in Palestine, it must certainly be inspired by a regional atmosphere outside Palestine's frontiers.) But war might improve the popularity of Ariel Sharon in Israel.-Published 6/11/03©bitterlemons-international.org

Mustapha Kamel al-Sayyid is a professor of political science at Colgate University. He is also the director of the Center for the Study of Developing Countries at Cairo University.