Hizballah: where to go from here

  Oussama Safa

Ten days into the cessation of hostilities, the shell-shocked Lebanese are scrambling to stave off the disastrous effects of the massive destruction of their country--destruction on a magnitude not seen since the end of the 15-year civil war.

The polarized political scene in Beirut on the eve of the war, masked by a round of futile dialogue sessions, will soon face a moment of truth: whether or not to move out of the deadlock and how. At stake is whether the "Party of God" will finally agree to disband its military wing and become a serious partner in the political process to develop a democratic state in Lebanon, and whether the government majority is willing to accommodate its demands in return. With the war over, it is now possible to rethink the political state system in Lebanon and Hizballah's new political role in it.

Following the end of hostilities, Hizballah was quick to declare strategic victory. It was bolstered by the tacit yet pervasive feeling among the Lebanese that a major military success had been achieved against an "untouchable" enemy. The party also announced an ambitious plan to compensate people who had been displaced by the war and to rebuild their damaged properties. Overwhelmingly Shi'ite, the displaced form the party's core constituency; their support will be required for future political repositioning. The announcement, made on the eve of the ceasefire, caught the government off guard. It seeks to ensure that the party's supporters are not enticed to shift allegiances, and to demonstrate that the party is also as capable of rebuilding as it is of making war.

The party sees itself as having written a major chapter in the history of the Middle East by inflicting heavy losses and thereby defeating the strongest army in the region. Emboldened, despite heavy civilian losses and the major concession of accepting the deployment of the Lebanese army in the south, Hizballah is seeking to consolidate by reaping political gains.

While the deal to deploy the army is ambiguous, to say the least, the party has in reality given away a major part of its ability to maneuver. In conceding the border region, Hizballah has abandoned observation posts, the free movement of its armed men among sensitive border positions and its ability to move heavy weapons--all of which were previously required to seize the military initiative. This means that it will no longer be able to mount operations like the July 12 abduction of Israeli soldiers or wage an all-out confrontation with Israel without appearing to be the violator of a ceasefire. With time, and if the truce translates into a sustainable ceasefire, Hizballah's weapons are bound to lose relevance and the party will lose the element of military surprise.

Politically, Hizballah is now at a crossroads. It will have to choose between the continuation of an ambiguous political agenda balancing Lebanese with Syrian-Iranian priorities along with its weapons on the one hand, and a strategy that includes a commitment to full implementation of the Taif agreement and UN Security Council resolutions and unequivocal participation in government, on the other. For the latter option to happen smoothly, the government majority will have to embrace Hizballah and get used to seeing its political influence grow and develop.

It is not clear how the party will interpret its military victory in political terms, but the decision to rebuild homes, a campaign of billboards boasting victory and an array of constructive speeches by the party's top leadership indicate preparations for a new political era. Hizballah emerged as a winner not so much because of its self-declared victory but because of the need for the party to play a legitimate and growing role in regenerating consensual politics. Hence it will have to be coaxed gently into full participation in the state. The question is whether the government majority will accommodate the party's new role, insofar as this might require giving it a larger share in the Council of Ministers, among other political perks.

The government is faced with the immediate challenge of creating a realistic and acceptable opening to Hizballah and injecting some creative thinking into the party's weapons dilemma. Clearly, the party will have to work hard to rebuff accusations regarding regional ambitions, by demonstrating beyond doubt that it can maintain Syria and Iran's influence at arm's length.

The war has proven that the Cedar Revolution's long march to democracy that started in the wake of the assassination of Rafiq Hariri cannot be completed without the full participation of Hizballah. There is now a chance to complete this march on a sound basis if the party agrees to join in on negotiated terms. Several issues will have to be resolved before this can happen, including agreement on a common vision for the future of the country and dispelling festering mutual misperceptions and deep-seated mistrust of political designs.

Once again there is an opportunity to rebuild Lebanon and rethink its state institutions. The next few weeks will show whether lessons from past failures have been learned and whether all Lebanese share the feeling of victory from this war.- Published 24/8/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Oussama Safa is general director of the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies in Beirut.