Try secret diplomacy

  Itamar Rabinovich

Damascus must have been pleased with the editorial published on August 9 by the International Herald Tribune. Under the title "The price of not talking to Syria's Assad", the IHT criticized President George W. Bush and his administration for ostracizing Syria and its President Bashar Assad and refusing to talk to them. "Syria is also unlikely to even consider doing what Bush wants--rein in Hizballah and help halt the killing in Lebanon and Israel--unless its leaders know what potential rewards as well as punishments await them. And for this the United States needs to offer a serious high-level discussion with Syria and it needs to do it now."

This and similar voices heard in the US, Europe and Israel during the past two weeks must have reinforced Syria's sense that so far it is a beneficiary of the fighting in Lebanon.

Since coming to power in June 2000, Assad's record, particularly in foreign policy, is disappointing. This has been manifested through four principal issues. First is the deterioration of relations with the US. During his 30 years in power, Hafez Assad had mastered the art of straddling the fence. He was a Soviet ally and client who kept the lines to Washington open. In the 1990s, he engaged in a dialogue with the US and in a peace process with Israel, while hosting the rejectionist Palestinian organizations in Damascus and supporting Hizballah in Lebanon.

His son's attempt to conduct an equally complex policy collapsed in 2003. George W. Bush and his administration came to see Syria as a practical member of the "axis of evil", a country and a regime fanning the anti-American insurrection in Iraq, supporting Palestinian and Lebanese terrorist organizations, suppressing Lebanon and its budding democracy and stockpiling weapons of mass destruction.

Twice, in 2003 and 2005, it seemed that the Bush administration was seeking to topple Bashar Assad, and twice its anti-Syria campaign was suspended in mid-course. Most recently, in 2005, Washington was restrained by two principal considerations: reluctance to open a full second front in the Middle East while bogged down in Iraq, and fear of opening the door to the Muslim Brotherhood as the most likely successor to the Assad regime.

A second issue is loss of position in Lebanon. Clearly, the highest echelons of the Baath regime were implicated in the assassination of Rafiq Hariri. This was a gross miscalculation that enabled an unusual coalition of domestic Lebanese forces, supported by the US and France, to seek and obtain the withdrawal of Syria's army from Lebanon. Syria has kept numerous assets in Lebanon, but the hegemonic position it had built in the late 1970s and consolidated in the 1980s and 1990s was significantly weakened.

Third is the end of the peace process. The failure of the Clinton-Assad summit in Geneva in March 2000 marked the end of the Syrian-Israeli peace process. During the 1990s, the Clinton administration and four Israeli prime ministers pursued a "Syria first" policy. These Israeli leaders were willing to withdraw from the Golan in order to achieve a satisfactory package of peace and security with Syria. The ultimate failure of these efforts was followed by political changes in Washington, Jerusalem and Damascus, with a devastating effect on the prospect of reviving the Syrian track of the peace process. Israeli PM Ariel Sharon decided to focus exclusively on the Palestinian issue and George W. Bush wouldn't hear of rewarding his bete noire, Bashar Assad, with the renewal of Israel-Syria negotiations.

A fourth issue is a weakening of position vis-a-vis Iran. Syria's strategic partnership with Iran dates back to 1979. During most of this period Hafez Assad was at the helm in Damascus and he conducted the relationship as a partnership of equals. His son's different stature, the decline in his country's position and Iran's build-up as a regional power have altered the equation. Syria is less of a partner and more of a client, protected by the senior, more powerful party.

Yet, in the past few months, Bashar Assad and his regime were emboldened by two developments. They realized that President Bush had practically called off the anti-Syria crusade of 2005 and came to the conclusion that they could take advantage of Iran's apparently successful quest for regional hegemony. Syria began to posture itself as an effective mediator between Iran and the Arab world. Syria's new boldness and self confidence were manifested in the overt patronage of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. In the spring of 2003, after Colin Powell's visit to Damascus, these and other groups were asked by the regime to lower their profile. Three years later their collaboration was played up as a political asset.

Like all crises, the outbreak of the war in Lebanon confronted Syria with both risks and opportunities. Damascus has walked a fine line, designated to keep Syria out of the war, to extend to Hizballah logistical and political support and to fend off domestic, Lebanese and Arab criticism that Syria was keeping a quiet front in the Golan while conducting its conflict with Israel purely at Lebanon's expense.

More significantly, the Assad regime realized that the war's course and outcome could alter its strategic position. The war is likely to end with Hizballah's position diminished in South Lebanon but preserved as a major political and military force in the country as a whole and as Iran's bridgehead. Any long term effort to deal with this challenge will require allies and mainstays; hence the argument that Washington must swallow its pride, overcome its disgust and talk to Syria. Syrian spokesmen have been trying to promote this line by telling American and European journalists that the alliance with Iran was "a marriage of convenience", hinting openly that it could be abandoned in return for a fruitful dialogue with Washington.

It is quite clear what Syria seeks to achieve through the resumption of the dialogue: an end to diplomatic isolation and de-legitimization, renewed recognition of its "special position" in Lebanon, and the return of the Golan issue to the Middle East diplomatic agenda.

This is a tall order. Furthermore, it is possible, if not likely, that Syria might seek the political and diplomatic dividends of such a dialogue without actually disengaging from Iran. If the US and Israel wish to establish, as they should, whether Syria could become a genuine partner in stabilizing Lebanon, the best course open to them is secret diplomacy.- Published 17/8/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Itamar Rabinovich is the incumbent of the Ettinger Chair at Tel-Aviv University and a distinguished global professor at NYU. He is a former chief negotiator with Syria and a former ambassador in Washington.