Don't hand Syria a political victory

  David Schenker

A year and a half into the international quarantine of Syria triggered by the assassination of former Lebanese PM Rafiq Hariri, Damascus has reemerged with a vengeance. In June, Hamas leader Khalid Meshaal declared responsibility from his Damascus safe haven for kidnapping an Israeli soldier. In July, Hizballah lobbed Syrian-made rockets into Haifa and employed Syrian anti-tank weapons against Israeli forces. Then in August, Damascus hosted a meeting of Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Iran. Syrian President Bashar Assad capped it off on Tuesday, August 15 with an incendiary speech lauding Hizballah's victory while attacking Israel, the Bush administration, the UN ceasefire plan, and the government of Lebanon.

Today, as the month-long Israel-Hizballah war winds down, despite this egregious behavior Damascus has found itself in the proverbial catbird seat. Notwithstanding the cancellation of the German foreign minister's visit in the wake of Assad's tirade, recent weeks have proven a diplomatic boon for isolated Syria. During this time, a string of European diplomats made pilgrimage to Damascus to petition Syrian support for an Israeli-Hizballah ceasefire; meanwhile in the US, pundits and policymakers began to agitate for Washington to reengage in a dialogue with Damascus.

A leading patron of Hamas and Hizballah, Syria played a key role in fomenting the crises in Gaza and Lebanon; but now many are looking to Damascus as part of the solution. To some extent, the renewed debate about engaging Syria is driven by a dearth of good policy options on Hizballah and Lebanon. But given Syria's continued unhelpful behavior on a broad range of issues--Lebanon, Gaza, and Iraq, to name a few--the international community should not presently be pursuing a dialogue with Damascus.

During Colin Powell's tenure as secretary of state, the Bush administration did engage in a dialogue with Syria, but discussions proved unfruitful because Assad did not honor his commitments. In particular, Assad shirked his pledges to stop smuggling oil out of Iraq in violation of UN sanctions and to close the offices of Palestinian terrorist organizations. These so-called misunderstandings did not inspire administration confidence in the efficacy of dialogue with Damascus. Perhaps more importantly, though, Syria's policies and rhetoric today do not suggest any inclination toward a change in behavior that would warrant a dialogue.

And then there are the costs of engagement. Should the US reinitiate talks with Syria, the first casualty would likely be Lebanon. Already reeling from a disastrous war, the March 14 Movement--Lebanon's democrats who expelled Syria in April 2005--would be further demoralized and undermined. The Syrians have also made no secret of their desire to see the Siniora government removed; Assad said as much in his August 15 speech. Accordingly, and based on current dynamics in Lebanon, Damascus would no doubt see reengagement as an invitation to return to Lebanon.

Another potential cost of opening a dialogue with Damascus would be the collapse of the international isolation of Syria that started with the Hariri assassination. Scaling back the isolation would signal an end to the pressure on Syria to change its problematic behavior. A re-emergent Syria could also influence, if not undermine, the integrity of the United Nations investigation into this and other murders in Lebanon believed to have been perpetrated by Syria. Worse, it could further embolden Syria to pursue adventurist and dangerous policies, such as the planting of an improvised explosive device on the Golan by a Syrian government-authorized organization on July 31.

Given the potentially high costs associated with opening a dialogue that is almost certain to fail, if and when a decision is made to initiate talks the US and the international community should make sure to set tough criteria for Syrian participation. In this regard, future dialogue with Damascus should be predicated on a significant and irreversible demonstration of Syrian good faith. A good start would be for Damascus to expel--or better yet render--leaders of terrorist organizations currently residing in Syria.

No doubt, Damascus would find these preconditions onerous, as Syria remains home to several Palestinian terrorist organizations, including Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, among others. But based on Washington's experience with President Assad, these conditions would be warranted. The conditions would also comport with the administration's counterterrorism policy.

A former US diplomat in Syria used to say that discussions with the Syrians regarding Hamas, PIJ, and Hizballah were largely "sterile" affairs. They were also futile affairs. Today, Syria remains a state sponsor of terrorism not because Washington refuses to engage with or otherwise offer sufficient incentives to Damascus. Syria supports terrorism because the repressive Assad regime perceives it to be in its interest.

During his August 15 speech, President Assad said it would be important to transform Hizballah's "military victory into political victory". Opening a dialogue with Syria now would provide Assad with the political victory he seeks.- Published 17/8/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

David Schenker is a senior fellow in Arab politics at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. From 2002-2006, he was the Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestinian affairs advisor in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.