A parallel strategy can free Washington

  Trita Parsi

The Bush administration has won much praise for finally realizing that it cannot succeed with its Middle East policy in general, and curtail Iranian nuclear ambitions in particular without negotiating directly with Iran. Less attention has been given to the unprecedented support Israel has offered this policy shift. Israel--who for years has opposed US-Iran talks--expressed support for Washington's decision and urged Jewish-American organizations to lower their profile on Iran.

Several factors have contributed to these developments. Washington has realized that its no-negotiation policy was gifting Iran an unlikely victory. Its options seemed to either be that Iran would get the bomb or the United States would be drawn into another war.

At the same time, Israel was faced with the prospect of seeing its uncompromising line on Iran lead to an unwinnable war that, unlike the Iraq conflict, was likely to also engulf Israel. On the bright side, however, America offered Israel explicit promises that it would come to the Jewish state's defense if attacked by Iran. "Israel is a close friend and ally of the United States, and in the event of any attack on Israel, the United States will come to Israel's aid," President Bush declared earlier in May.

These two developments--Washington's offer of talks with Iran and Israel's support of this move--are as unprecedented as they are necessary. At best, Washington's new direction and Israel's unforeseen agreement have the potential of paving the way for resolving the Israeli-Iranian geo-strategic puzzle. In a proposal to Washington in May 2003, the Iranians signaled a willingness to formally endorse a two-state solution in return for Iran's decontainment. At worst, these developments can further entangle Washington in a web of bilateral defense agreements that reduces the maneuverability for peacemaking and increases the likelihood of a complete collapse of the already fragile Middle East order.

President Bush's promise of coming to Israel's defense directly addressed an apprehension that has haunted Israel for more than a decade. Since the early 1990s, Israel has feared that improved US-Iranian relations could come at Israel's expense. Israeli decision-makers wondered whether Washington would be tempted to betray Israeli security interests when faced with the opportunity to reconcile with Tehran.

Israel's confidence in America's reliability had already taken a blow during the Persian Gulf War, when Washington reigned in Israel's inclination to retaliate against Iraqi Scud attacks.

Washington sent Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger to Israel to--on a daily basis--assure the Israelis that the US was doing all it could to destroy the missile launchers in Iraq from which Saddam was hurling his Scuds. But according to Efraim Halevi, former head of the Mossad, both the Israeli army and the Israeli Ministry of Defense were unconvinced by Eagleburger's assurances. This caused much bad blood and disbelief as to whether the US could be relied upon when it came to Israel's existence. At the end of the day, America's protection was ineffective and the image that Israel was relying on the US for its security was hard to stomach for the Israeli public, Halevi writes in his book, Man in the Shadows.

The result of the geo-political turmoil after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the defeat of Iraq was that both Israel and Iran sought to undermine US foreign policy initiatives in the Middle East that they deemed beneficial to the other. Israel aimed to prevent a US-Iran rapprochement and Iran acted against the Middle East peace process since, it feared, the Oslo agreement would lead to an Israel-centric Middle East order based on Iran's prolonged isolation. Even at the height of its strength, America could not neutralize Iranian and Israeli spoiling efforts.

It is in light of this that Washington's decision to simultaneously offer Iran conditional talks and Israel protection against possible Iranian aggressions must be seen. There seems to be a realization among realists in the Bush administration that Washington only can free itself from the chains of the Israeli-Iranian strategic rivalry by addressing both sides of this equation at the same time; ensuring Israel that talks with Tehran will not jeopardize its security while impressing on Iran that Washington sees room for both a special relationship with Israel and global and regional reintegration for Iran.

These two steps will only work, however, if they are consistently taken in tandem. If talks with Iran break down, if they fail to take place due to squabbling over preconditions, or if Washington intends the offer merely as a tactical maneuver aimed at winning time and strengthening international support for punishing Iran, then the security guarantees offered to Israel may, instead of advancing peace, draw Washington and Israel into a major showdown with Iran with unpredictable regional and global repercussions.

Disregarding the inescapable reality that the standoff with Iran lacks a unilateral solution can turn American security guarantees into a promise that only serves to ensure conflict. Israel should be cautious not to overestimate the value of such promises.- Published 6/7/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Trita Parsi is the author of Treacherous Alliance--The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran and the US and a silver medal recipient of the Council on Foreign Relations' Arthur Ross Book Award.