May 04, 2006 Edition 16 Volume 4
 

A Saudi perspective

  Anwar Majid Eshki

When a conflict becomes prolonged, new centers of power evolve and interact in ways that can lead to more extremism or to more moderation. In an atmosphere of dictatorship this evolution takes longer, because a change of leadership can only be brought about by means of a revolution or a coup d'etat. In contrast, it is easier to attain leadership in a democratic atmosphere, regardless of the balance of power between the parties to the conflict.

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has persisted for more than half a century. During this time, numerous Palestinian organizations emerged, and eventually came together under the umbrella of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The autocratic rule of Yasser Arafat facilitated the unification of most of these groups.

The conflict has taken forms varying from dialogue to violence. The Israeli side has suffered from the confrontation, recognized the hard reality on the ground and realized that not all its ambitions can be realized. There have emerged a number of Israeli parties that believe it is impossible to attain all of their difficult goals and have backed down under the pressure of violence and the international community. They have replaced their prior, geographic objectives with economic ones, i.e., running the Israeli economy instead of dominating the land.

The Palestinians initially demanded as their right the liberation of the entire land, with the support of all Arabs. International realities eventually forced them to acknowledge the Israeli right of ownership. This led to PLO submission and compliance.

The violence (or counter-violence) practiced by Israel halted every negotiation. Increasingly, Hamas was perceived as representing, in power and practice, the Palestinian people, and carried out violent operations with its blessing, while the autocratic Arafat was perceived as the catalyst behind the Palestinian rejection of any solution put forward by Israel. Arafat's departure, the return to the democratic system and public support moved Hamas, with its tough stance, into the leadership position in the Palestinian Authority. This was shocking for Israel, which believed it had already made concessions and compromises to secure recognition during negotiations.

The Likud party heading the government in Israel came to accept that matters would not be resolved merely by being tough or extreme. This led to the emergence of Kadima, the new joint party, with its readiness to accept some sort of a sovereign Palestinian state.

Though Hamas has from the beginning been considered a terrorist movement in the eyes of the US, the Israelis and some other countries, it has not been seen this way from the Arab and Saudi perspective. By winning at the ballot box with the approval of international observers, Hamas upheld the rights of the electorate. It seized the initiative and formed a government, leaving world leaders perplexed.

Saudi Arabia has never looked upon Hamas as a terrorist movement. Saudi Arabia also does not prefer violence, but it blames the Israelis for their extensive use of violence as a counter-terror response to operations made by an unarmed population trying to defend and free itself. The fault is with the Israelis, who are responsible for the tranquility of the people and the integrity of the land under their control. The Israelis are in fact behind all the violent responses of Hamas.

The United States and Israel have pressured Hamas to recognize Israel. But Hamas does not pay attention to either enemy pressure or advice from friends who understand its needs. Hamas leaders believe that recognizing the Israeli entity is a political trump card for negotiations, one that must only be bargained away in return for an honorable price for the Palestinian people. When Palestinian Islamic Jihad took responsibility for a violent operation in Tel Aviv on April 17 that killed or wounded more than 63 Israelis, Hamas blamed Israel for escalation and violence that killed at least 20 Palestinians in Gaza.

The Tel Aviv operation sent a message to Israel that if violence does not stop on both sides, there will emerge another organization that is tougher and harsher. The worst that can be imagined is that Israel and the US gamble on internal conflict among Palestinians. That is not going to happen; Palestinians trust neither the Israelis nor the Americans, and as we have seen, pressure merely hardens their stance. The Kadima party should by now have concluded that it should revert to dialogue and negotiations in order for peace to hold.

The Saudi standpoint is clear and direct and is configured around King Abdullah's initiative, approved by the Arab Summit in Beirut. It addresses the objectives of both sides, and can be realized through the roadmap. The inevitable end-product is a sovereign Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. This requires mutual recognition and the path of negotiations. This is what the government of Saudi Arabia has been calling for all along. - Published 4/5/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Maj. Gen. Dr. Anwar Majid Eshki is chairman of the Middle East Center for Strategic and Legal Studies, president of the Al-Haramain Center for Research and Endowment Studies and an advisor to the Special Committee of the Saudi Council of Ministers.



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Also in this edition:

Moderating Hamas: Egyptian policy
   Gamal A.G. Soltan
One eye on Hamas, the other on the Brotherhood
   Oraib Rantawi
A new model for Islamic movements
   an interview with Ghazi Hamad
A Saudi perspective
   Anwar Majid Eshki