Uneasy neighbors

  Irfan Husain

As the confrontation sharpens over Iran's nuclear program, few Pakistani analysts have expressed much concern over the possibility of atomic weapons arrayed on their western border. Thus far, most people are more irked over perceived American bullying of an Islamic neighbor than they are nervous about a possible threat.

But given the ongoing Shi'ite-Sunni tensions that have often turned violent, it is only a matter of time before the situation changes. Pakistan's relations with Iran underwent a sea-change with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the following civil war. Earlier, especially under the Shah, Iran was one of Pakistan's closest friends and allies. The Khomeini revolution brought about a measure of rethinking as Pakistan's elite, despite lip service to Islam, certainly did not want a Khomeini-style revolution. And with then-President Zia ul-Haq's increasing reliance on the mullahs for support, it became important to emphasize the doctrinaire differences between orthodox Shi'ite and Sunni beliefs, minor though they are. Zia's encouragement of violent Sunni groups like the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi bred a number of hydra-headed terrorist gangs that have declared Shi'ites as non-Muslims.

This growing sectarian divide was reflected in the conduct of the Afghan civil war, in which Pakistan supported the most radical Sunni groups, finally settling on the benighted Taliban. Iran, on the other hand, armed Shi'ite groups like Shah Ahmed Masoud's in the Panjshir Valley. These differences often spilled out in the open, and led to increasing rivalry between the military and intelligence organizations in both countries.

As Pakistan continues its slide into an ideological Sunni state, its competition with Shi'ite Iran is bound to sharpen. There are already tensions over Pakistan's support for the United States. Iranian President Ahmadinezhad's public rebuke to Muslim states talking to Israel was clearly aimed at Islamabad. Thus far Iran's nuclear program, while not perceived as a threat, has certainly not been well-received by anti-Shi'ite groups.

Another factor that causes unease among defense analysts is India's growing commercial relations with Iran. While encirclement is too strong a term for the current threat analysis, New Delhi's increasing influence with Tehran cannot bode well for Islamabad, which has traditionally viewed its western neighbor as a source of strategic depth in case of an armed conflict with India.

One reason for Iran to run the gauntlet to acquire nuclear weapons is the knowledge that Pakistan, a Sunni state, already has them. More than Washington and Tel Aviv, Tehran has reason to fear Sunni zealots in Islamabad with access to a nuclear arsenal and a delivery system. If this is the West's worst nightmare, so is it Iran's.

If Pakistan is not yet wary of Iran's nuclear ambitions, it is because they have not yet registered on Pakistan's political and security radar. Another view is that between Washington and Tel Aviv, somebody else will sort out this problem. So if a few cruise missiles do take out some Iranian nuclear installations not many genuine tears will be shed, although many editorials and street protests will condemn this act.

Given the ideological differences that have surfaced between Iran and Pakistan over the last two decades, it is increasingly obvious that their strategic interests are now widely divergent. Pakistan, while an increasingly Islamic state, sees its future as linked to the West. Iran, with the luxury of vast oil reserves, can afford more extreme ideological and anti-western postures. In Tehran, intellectuals openly sneer at President Pervez Musharraf's pro-Bush policy, and this is often reflected in the officially condoned media.

Secular Pakistanis who opposed the country's nuclear program view the introduction of any new WMDs into this volatile region with alarm. Mullahs are not the most rational people to have in control over such dangerous weapons. The risk is that, lacking a scientific education, they will see nuclear warheads as just bigger bombs to smite their foes with. With their sights fixed on the afterlife with all its promised delights, they would be more prone to pull the nuclear trigger than more skeptical souls.

Despite these real and potential concerns, the pressure being applied by Washington and Tel Aviv on a fellow Muslim country is causing public anger in Pakistan. The usual argument is trotted out: if Israel can have a nuclear arsenal, why cannot Iran? The truth is that most people in Pakistan cheered when the country's scientists first tested their bombs in 1998. Few considered or analyzed the implications of acquiring such weapons. Now, seven years later, some of us realize we may be more, not less, vulnerable: in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Musharraf cited the threat to Pakistan's nuclear installations as one reason for his agreeing to support Bush's war against terror and Washington's toppling of the Taliban.

All said and done, if Iran's nuclear dreams are suddenly shattered through outside intervention, most of the tears shed in Pakistan will be crocodile tears.- Published 5/1/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Irfan Husain writes two columns a week for Dawn, Pakistan's widest circulating and most influential daily. After a career in the civil service spanning 30 years, he was president of a university in Pakistan for five years. He now divides his time between England and Pakistan.