Through the lens of Iraq

  Robert S. Leiken

If the Madrid bombings demonstrated al-Qaeda's emergence as a geopolitical actor, the July attacks in London seem to indicate that , despite premature claims of its demise, an al-Qaeda core still controls the global jihad, strategically and ideologically if not organizationally and tactically .

The Madrid and London bombings and the assassination of a critic of radical Islam in the Netherlands signify that Islamist terrorism has opened a strategic front in Europe. Europe will be pinned down at home, increasingly harassed and sometimes divided, while the big war grinds on in Iraq. Bin Laden now provides encouragement and strategic orientation to scores of quasi-independent European jihadi groups that assemble for specific missions, drawing operatives from a pool of professionals and apprentices, and then dissolve only to regroup for another exploit.

Western Europe sports two kinds of candidate Muslim terrorists. Some are "outsiders": alien dissidents, typically asylum seekers or students, who gained refuge in liberal Europe from anti-Islamist crackdowns in the Middle East. Among these are radical imams who preach militant Islam, lend their mosques or cultural centers or bookstores to terrorist recruiters, and sometimes serve as spiritual fathers of jihad networks.

But the July 7 London bombings have also drawn attention to "insiders": alienated citizens from the European-born second or third generation. If some get recruited in jails, most are contacted in Islamic cultural centers or on university campuses, in secondary schools and even in junior high. These upwardly mobile radicals undergo an anti-West westernization: integration into the home country's adversary culture. Like the four men who wreaked havoc on the London transportation system and the Amsterdam assassin Mohammed B., these are young men born and socialized in Europe--and entitled to passports and visa-free travel to the US.

European intelligence sources have told me of scores of home grown jihadists who have been recruited in Europe and conducted to Iraq's Sunni Triangle, often through the Balkans, Turkey or Syria, reportedly with the assistance of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, bin Laden's "Emir of Iraq". Indeed, al-Qaeda's strategic priorities in Europe are best viewed through the lens of Iraq. Al-Qaeda's planners believe that in Iraq the West is particularly vulnerable. Terror strikes can augment popular opposition to the war, forcing withdrawal of US allies from Iraq, as already has happened in Spain. If the governments remain steadfast, as in England, more pressure can be applied. Certainly such tactics can backfire, as is so far the case in Britain, but look for new attacks in Italy and Denmark, US allies in Iraq.

Recent attacks in Europe fit eerily well within a plan issued by al-Qaeda in December 2003. Entitled "Jihadi Iraq: Hopes and Dangers," the document outlined a strategy that would split the US from the rest of the coalition. Three countries were considered as targets: Poland, Britain, and Spain. Poland, the author concluded, would likely remain staunchly involved in Iraq because the Poles generally supported their government's decision to ally with the US. Britain and Spain, however, offered opportunities. The Spanish government was placed at the top of the al-Qaeda hit list due to the unpopularity of the war among the population and the upcoming elections. If, the author argued, Spain was attacked, the government would have to rethink involvement in Iraq.

The document concluded that Britain too could be forced to withdraw from Iraq under certain conditions. The first was an escalation of military casualties among the British in Iraq, the second was the prior departure of another ally, either Spain or Italy. Roughly 16 months after bombs ripped through Spanish trains, Britain was subjected to similar attacks. But instead of waiting for strategic redirection, groups throughout Europe have added their own appendices to al-Qaeda's strategic guidelines. Hours after the attacks, web postings appeared claiming credit and slating Denmark and Italy for future attacks.

All this puts the US in a catch-22. The war is proving a godsend for al-Qaeda, but withdrawal could consolidate a terrorist or a failed state and send a defeatist message. For the present, the US and Europe need to put their Iraq disagreements aside and join forces to defeat terrorism in Europe.- Published 18/8/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Robert S. Leiken is director of the Immigration and National Security Program at the Nixon Center in Washington, DC, and a non-resident fellow at the Brookings Institution. He is the author of Bearers of Global Jihad? Immigration and Security after 9/11.