Morocco: a nuanced view

  Aboubakr Jamai

Morocco is usually considered relatively advanced in its democratization process. Relatively, that is, compared to other Arab countries. Prominent among the hailers of Moroccan "democratization" has been the American administration, especially since the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

Many reasons have earned the Moroccan regime the support of the Bush administration. To be sure, the organization of national elections in November 2002 and local elections in September 2003, which were not obviously rigged, and the reform of the personal status law in 2003, were rare enough in the region to be underlined. However, the Moroccan regime's cooperation in the "war on terror", its relatively benign attitude toward the Sharon government as evidenced by King Mohammed VI's reception of Israeli Foreign Minister Sylvan Shalom, and its enthusiastic embrace of the Free Trade Agreement despite the opposition of a vocal civil society, have certainly contributed to America's affection for the country.

Crucially, the Moroccan regime's attitude toward the Bush administration also provides a much needed argument in favor of American foreign policy in the region. A fairly democratizing and stable regime, by regional standards at least, playing or appearing to play by the rulebook of the free market economy and yet uncritical of American foreign policy in the Middle East, is a testimony to the validity of the Bush administration's approach to the region.

However, the social background of the Moroccans involved in international terrorist attacks and in the May 16, 2003 Casablanca suicide bombings, and their probable utilization of the informal economy to finance their deeds, have underlined the spill-over effect of the Moroccan regime's governance. A closer look at the political and economic evolution of the country offers a more nuanced view.

The death of King Hassan II in July 1999, and the first liberal decisions taken by his successor, Mohammed VI, brought the hope of truly democratic transition. But the evolution of the political and economic landscape has not fully confirmed that hope.

On the political side, the regime organized two major elections. The legislative elections took place in 2002. Many observers remained skeptical about their transparency; as of today, their detailed results have not been published--details that could prove they were rigged. It is believed that the only authorized Islamist party, the PJD, was the main target of the government's tampering with the elections results, which gave the best configuration possible for the monarchy: a fragmented political landscape.

As for the municipal elections, the regime used the May 16, 2003 Casablanca terrorist attacks and the anti-PJD campaign waged by parties close to the monarchy to limit the participation of the Islamists, first by preventing their most popular leader from running and then by limiting the number of districts in which the PJD was allowed to present a candidate. For example, in Casablanca, a stronghold of the PJD, it was permitted to have candidates in only half of the districts. It is believed that this policy led to some dismally low participation rates in the big cities; in some districts in Casablanca and Tangiers it did not surpass 30 percent.

On the human rights front, an Equity and Reconciliation Commission (IER) began work to definitively settle serious violations of human rights, including compensation for all outstanding cases of arbitrary detention and disappearance, prior to the king's assumption of the throne in 1999. Although an encouraging development, this initiative has been criticized for preventing victims from revealing the identity of their torturers, and for overlooking the human rights abuses perpetrated by the police after the terrorist attacks in 2003. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International published reports documenting these "systematic" abuses and revealed the existence of a secret detention center in the suburbs of Rabat.

On the economic front, one of the disturbing results of the reforms is, apart from the maintenance of the patronage system, the increasing pre-eminence of the king as businessman. The monarchy seems to have used the reforms to capture a bigger chunk of the private economy. The king controls a number of companies with stock market capitalization amounting to 30 percent of the total Casablanca stock exchange. This entrepreneurial voracity is scaring the business community, which fears competing with a monarchy that enjoys quasi-absolute powers. The end result of this strategy, coupled with a notoriously corrupt judiciary, is the effective crowding out of the local business community, thereby explaining the dearth of national private investment.

Another negative development is rampant corruption. Morocco has been sliding down the Transparency International Corruption Index since the year 2000. Even the much vaunted macroeconomic stability of the country has been jeopardized lately. Credit Suisse First Boston, an international bank closely watching Morocco, titled one of its recent research reports "Morocco heading for the rocks with an overly loose 2005 budget".

Another worrying sign is the yearly four percent urban expansion due mainly to rural migration. The lack of public investment, coupled with the potential downfall of major industries employing low skilled labor, represent a major potential threat to the regime. Until now, poverty has been mainly concentrated in the rural areas, making it difficult for political entrepreneurs to mobilize. In urban areas, it will be a more readily usable resource. The Islamist opposition, both the PJD and the banned movement Al-Adl Wa Al-Ihssan, seems to be the best positioned to take advantage of this evolution.

Will the monarchy heed the calls for a truly democratic constitutional reform, refrain from its predatory behavior and allow for the relative de facto independence of the legislative, judicial and executive branches as the army has done in Turkey? Or will it exploit this new geo-strategic rent accruing from the "war on terror" to stem democratic change?

The complexity of the dilemma is further compounded by the contradictions of the Bush administration. These can be summarized by its oxymoronic formula in the present context of Middle Eastern politics: democratization without the accession to power of anti-American forces.- Published 10/3/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Aboubakr Jamai is the editor of Le Journal Hebdomadaire in Casablanca