Across the Jordan River

  Oded Eran

Exactly seven years ago I submitted my credentials to the late King Hussein as Israel's second ambassador to Jordan. The excitement at hearing the Israeli anthem played at the old Royal Court was enhanced by the knowledge that the king had taken a very courageous decision. Not his first, but probably one of his last. Ten days earlier Mossad agents had been caught in an abortive attempt to kill a Hamas leader, Khaled Mashal, in the streets of Amman. In a way, the proximity of the two events reflects the problems, the attitudes and the complex web of relations between Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

For years the kingdom was taken for granted. The departure of the British godfathers, the growth of anti-western regimes in Iraq, Syria and Egypt, and the rise of Palestinian nationalism, all contributed to the relative weakness of Jordan. Israel viewed itself, rightly or wrongly, as Jordan's sole guarantor. That perception was certainly enhanced in 1970, when Syrian tanks, already rolling toward Jordan, were stopped by the Israel Air Force.

The Mashal affair is just an example of that attitude. It also highlighted the kingdom's and mostly King Hussein's mature handling of the affair and generally of relations with Israel. Surrounded by uneasy and always scheming neighbors, Jordan had to juggle several balls in the air: its relations with neighbors such as Syria under the Assads, Iraq, mostly under Saddam Hussein, rivals from the Arabian Peninsula who had defeated the Hashemites at the beginning of the twentieth century and pushed them to the north and, above all, the explosive Israeli-Palestinian arena to the west.

It is against this backdrop that Israel should appreciate the way Jordan conducts relations with it. In many cases Israel's responses have been positive, showing recognition and vision. These include the annual transfers of sizable quantities of water even in dry years. Cooperation with Jordan on the creation of Qualified Industrial Zones, which have generated thousands of jobs in Jordan and a dramatic increase in exports, is another example. But the glass could be fuller with bold initiatives that could transform sub-regions straddling the border. In the Aqaba-Eilat region, for example, Jordan and Israel could gain from closer cooperation by reaching an agreement by which Israel would use the port and airport of Aqaba, creating jobs and higher incomes for Jordanians, and the land on the Israeli side currently used by those two facilities would be developed for other, more profitable purposes. Cooperation in other fields, such as tourism, could also inject new life into an industry that has suffered a serious decline in recent years. For these initiatives to happen, both countries and their leaders have to show courage and vision to overrule skeptics, even when the latter might, in the short-run, be justified in their skepticism.

In anticipation of dangerous and unsettling future political, demographic and economic changes, a high level of understanding and a close dialogue on short term and strategic policies are essential if Jordan and Israel wish to protect their individual and mutual interests. The east bank of the Jordan River is a mirror of what happens on the west side. Higher tension or periods of tranquility are reflected in the reactions of public opinion and the Jordanian government. It is essential for Israel to take this, whenever possible, into consideration. Conversely, actions or inaction by Jordan, in matters related and relevant to Israel, have an impact there. The Jordanian monarch and the government have not always been cognizant of this sensitivity. The Jordanian official reaction to the anti-normalization groups, for example, was slow and feeble.

In an unstable region such as the Middle East, tacit strategic understandings between Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan helped the two cross some unsettling currents, even before the formal treaty was concluded. The first war in the Gulf, in 1990-91, is a good example. The second Palestinian intifada and the stalemate in the political process between Israel and the Palestinians have put relations between Israel and Jordan to a test. King Abdullah II of Jordan has shown great fortitude, resolve and maneuverability in overcoming the strain and difficulties presented by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While Israel should conduct its Palestinian policy independently, it should take into consideration, as much as possible, Jordan's sensitivities on this issue.

In my stay in Amman I witnessed how, when necessary, the political leaders of Jordan and Israel and those responsible for handling various aspects of the relations made use of the geographical proximity. They met aboard almost every means of transportation except, if I am not mistaken, a train. In this connection I have two hopes: that the absence of the train does not prevent Jordanians and Israelis from meeting at all levels, and that eventually a feasibility study will prove that a railway between the Red and Dead seas is a sound economic idea. The frequent meetings and joint projects would ensure the longevity of the 10-year-old Jordan-Israel peace treaty.- Published 28/10/2004 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Oded Eran is director of the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv. He served as Israel's ambassador to Jordan and the EU and is a former negotiator with Egypt and the Palestinians.