An alliance revisited?

  Alon Pinkas

For over three decades, Israeli political, military, academic and media circles have tended to view US-Israel relations as some form of a strategic alliance. This self-image is based on a combination of shared values, a natural affinity between democracies, a by-and-large similar geo-political outlook, a commonality of interests and most importantly, what Yossi Alpher has termed a "strategic triangle" consisting of the US, Israel and the political power and clout of American Jews.

Conveniently forgetting or dismissing earlier American administrations' coolness toward Israel and their political-realism-based approaches to the Middle East, these Israeli circles regard American friendship with Israel as a central pillar of Israel's national security and a regional deterrent and force multiplier. They have even proudly defined Israel as nothing less than a political and military "strategic asset" to American foreign policy, both in the context of the Cold War and within the geo-political confines of the Middle East. The evolution and shaping of relations between the US and Israel in the last 40 years renders this general characterization viable and fairly accurate.

This was not the case in earlier years. After President Truman's unenthusiastic recognition of Israel in 1948, Eisenhower exhibited disinterest while attempting to forge regional alliances with Turkey, Pakistan and Egypt, and was angry about Israel's collusion with France and Britain in the Suez war in 1956. Kennedy tried unsuccessfully to lure Nasser's Egypt into the US orbit in 1962-63.

But after the 1967 Six-Day War and Johnson's decision to sell Israel offensive military platforms such as Patton tanks and Skyhawk and F-4 Phantom jets (all in the context of a patron-client relationship opposing Soviet mentorship of Egypt and Syria), the pro-Israel tide gelled irreversibly. Nixon's policy--supported by generous grants--of rehabilitating the Israeli military after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and further diplomatic and military-related commitments by successive administrations ever since, have shaped the contours and contents of the US-Israel relationship as it evolved into an informal, non-treaty alliance. America consciously sacrificed broader regional interests as it invested in forging that alliance.

If there ever was a serious debate within the American foreign-policy and decision-influencing establishment regarding America's interests in the Middle East and the implications they have on US support for Israel, it ended resoundingly and unequivocally in Israel's favor. Now the question is: are these relations deep, solid, strong and durable enough to sustain what appears to be a reexamination and possibly an overhaul of US foreign policy in the region? Do such changes in priorities and a redefinition of interests necessarily mean a weakening of the US-Israel alliance, a transformation of the tenets of the "special relationship" or, conversely, do they hold the promise and potential of improving relations in the long run?

A content analysis of President Barack Obama's rhetoric after his recent meeting with Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, and previous references he and senior members of his administration made about Israel and the Middle East peace process reveals that on the surface nothing significant has changed in tone or substance. The US and Israel are "allies", whose friendship is "unshakable" thanks to "unwavering" US support that remains "committed" to ensuring Israel's security. But while it is premature to describe Obama's ideas on the Middle East as a coherent and detailed "plan" (his scheduled speech in Cairo on June 4 may provide a better understanding of American principles and ideas for the next few years), Israelis who follow Washington politics have discerned a point of inflection. It is unclear if this is merely a change of style, a reprioritization of American interests or really substantive policy revisions.

America and Israel have had their differences and periodic confrontations before, most notably the Suez crisis of 1956, President Ford's "reassessment" of US policy following Henry Kissinger's failed mission in March 1975 while mediating an Israeli-Egyptian interim agreement in the Sinai and President H. W. Bush's decision to withhold loan guarantees to Israel in response to Prime Minister Shamir's intransigence over settlements in 1991. Moreover, the US has repeatedly described Israeli settlements in the West Bank (and Gaza) as an "obstacle to peace" (a point Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton repeatedly made in the last few days) and has had disagreements with Israel over its peace policies.

If Obama displays in the realm of foreign policy in general, and in the Middle East in particular, the same frenzy of activity that he has demonstrated in domestic policy--highlighted by "change" and a sharp departure from the policies of George W. Bush--then there is a reasonable chance that Israel and the US are headed toward another showdown. Right now it looks as if US-Israel relations may be remodeled as a throwback to the Reagan (and Secretary of State George Shultz) days of 1982-1988: Israel is an ally, but not the only one. The US supports Israel fundamentally and visibly but it has broader interests in improving its relations with the Muslim and Arab world. The US will present a comprehensive peace plan after years of impasse. The US perceives a nuclear Iran to be a regional danger and destabilizing agent, yet Pakistan is the more imminent challenge. The US is attentive and committed to Israel's security concerns and needs, but Israel can no longer drag its feet and must take tangible steps on the Palestinian issue, including a commitment to the idea of an ultimate two-state solution.

Relations may very well be strong enough to endure a major disagreement, but assuming Obama persists and pushes, Israel will be required to calibrate its own policies and make adjustments compatible with US interests--if not for the sake of peace, then at least for the sake of preserving the alliance.- Published 21/5/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org

Alon Pinkas is president of the US-Israel Institute at the Rabin Center and former consul-general of Israel in New York.