The war exposes Arab divisions

  Hassan A. Barari

The Israel-Hamas war posed a dilemma for the Jordanian government in its reaction to unfolding events. As the war brought inter-Arab divisions to the fore, the Jordanian government felt compelled to take a clear stand with regard to evolving regional alignments. Jordan seemed to be wavering between two dominant positions that define the degree of polarization within Arab political dynamics.

These positions were evident from the outset. On the one hand, Egypt stood out as a key player; it followed a delicate path to make sure the outcome of the war would be conducive to its regional interests. For Egypt, the stakes were high: although it condemned the war, it was daring enough to call a spade a spade. FM Ahmed Aboul Gheit reiterated that Egypt had warned Hamas of the grave consequences of ending the truce, thus explicitly pinning the blame on Hamas. Although it was obvious that Egypt's role in achieving a ceasefire was indispensable, the Saudi role in the reconstruction of Gaza has become equally important. The Egyptian-Saudi bloc maintained its position for the duration of the war, showing little support for Hamas.

On the other hand Syria, backed by Iran and all its proxies in the region, supported Hamas and called for the Arabs to deter Israel. Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah went a step further in calling on Egyptians to defy their leadership. His incitement of the Egyptian army to act independently and force President Mubarak to change his stand was, to say the least, outrageous. To the moderates, it was obvious that the other bloc was exploiting the war to galvanize the masses as a means of settling accounts. Paradoxically, the rejectionist camp failed to back up its rhetoric with tangible aid, thus leaving Hamas in the lurch as it fought Israel.

This was how Jordanians analyzed the deepening inter-Arab divisions following the war. Jordan sought to take the middle path between the two blocs--a function of Jordan's sensitive regional position.

Accordingly, Jordan permitted scores of demonstrations condemning Israel's actions in Gaza. Jordanian political forces capitalized on this new mood and called for the abrogation of the Jordan-Israel peace treaty and the expulsion of the Israeli ambassador from Amman. This in turn led to a kind of "Hamasization" of the Jordanian street, a development that worked to the detriment of Egypt and of PLO leader Mahmoud Abbas and was of some concern to them.

Many argue that the sacking of the director of the Jordanian General Intelligence Department Mohammed Dahabi happened partly because he was behind the decision to open up relations with Hamas. In doing so, Dahabi had assessed that the Palestinian Authority would most probably collapse in 2009. He reckoned that a void would follow and that it could be filled by Hamas and concluded that it was therefore in Jordan's best interest to open channels of communication with Hamas.

The sacking of Dahabi coincided with an Arab call for a summit to discuss Gaza. The call came from Qatar, which is perceived as being closer to the radical bloc. In a knee-jerk reaction, Egypt and Saudi Arabia refused to attend the summit, fearing lest a Doha summit expose their inability to stop or deter Israel. This position left little room for Jordan to maneuver.

In contrast, Syria and Qatar saw in the summit an opportunity to revive Arab solidarity, even though such a development would force some Arab countries to forfeit their comparatively good relations with Israel. In view of this regional dichotomy, Jordan eventually opted to boycott the Doha summit and realign with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The Doha meeting lacked the necessary quorum, thereby providing Jordan with a pretext for not attending.

In short, Jordan made the right choices right up to the conclusion of the war by remaining in a diplomatic grey area and emerging from the crisis with minimal damage. Amman allowed the masses to express anti-war sentiments without being seen to take sides in an inter-Arab dispute. It hoped in this way to maintain its traditional relations with the Saudis and Egyptians without hurting its newly flourishing relationship with the other camp.- Published 29/1/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org

Hassan A. Barari is professor of Middle East studies at the University of Nebraska at Omaha and the author of "Israelism: Arab Scholarship on Israel, A Critical Assessment" (London: Ithaca, 2009)